created | 2023-08-05T05:00:33Z |
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begin | 2023-07-31T00:00:00Z |
end | 2023-08-01T00:00:00Z |
path | src/sys |
commits | 8 |
date | 2023-07-31T01:33:57Z | |||
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author | guenther | |||
files | src/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/codepatch.c | log | diff | annotate |
src/sys/arch/amd64/include/codepatch.h | log | diff | annotate | |
message |
The replacement code passed to codepatch_replace() can usefully be const. suggested by bluhm@ |
date | 2023-07-31T04:01:07Z | |||
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author | guenther | |||
files | src/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/cpu.c | log | diff | annotate |
src/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/locore.S | log | diff | annotate | |
src/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/vector.S | log | diff | annotate | |
src/sys/arch/amd64/conf/Makefile.amd64 | log | diff | annotate | |
src/sys/arch/amd64/include/codepatch.h | log | diff | annotate | |
message |
On CPUs with eIBRS ("enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation") or IBT enabled the kernel, the hardware should the attacks which retpolines were created to prevent. In those cases, retpolines should be a net negative for security as they are an indirect branch gadget. They're also slower. * use -mretpoline-external-thunk to give us control of the code used for indirect branches * default to using a retpoline as before, but marks it and the other ASM kernel retpolines for code patching * if the CPU has eIBRS, then enable it * if the CPU has eIBRS *or* IBT, then codepatch the three different retpolines to just indirect jumps make clean && make config required after this ok kettenis@ |
date | 2023-07-31T09:00:43Z | |||
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author | kettenis | |||
files | src/sys/dev/fdt/axppmic.c | log | diff | annotate |
src/sys/dev/fdt/files.fdt | log | diff | annotate | |
message |
Make the RSB interface optional such that we can use this driver in kernels without the sxirsb(4) driver. ok uaa@ |
date | 2023-07-31T11:13:09Z | |||
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author | dlg | |||
files | src/sys/net/if_pfsync.c | log | diff | annotate |
src/sys/net/pf.c | log | diff | annotate | |
message |
don't let pfsync send an insert message for a state pfsync just inserted sthen@ upgraded and ended up with a lot of pfsync traffic which was mostly made up of the two firewalls telling each other to insert the same state over and over again. this has each of the paths that insert states (actual pf, ioctls, and pfsync) identify themselves so pfsync can enter them into its own state machine in the right place. when pfsync inserts a state into pf, it knows it should just swallow the state silently without sending out another insert for it. ok sthen@ sashan@ |
date | 2023-07-31T11:13:10Z | |||
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author | dlg | |||
files | src/sys/net/if_pfsync.h | log | diff | annotate |
message |
don't let pfsync send an insert message for a state pfsync just inserted sthen@ upgraded and ended up with a lot of pfsync traffic which was mostly made up of the two firewalls telling each other to insert the same state over and over again. this has each of the paths that insert states (actual pf, ioctls, and pfsync) identify themselves so pfsync can enter them into its own state machine in the right place. when pfsync inserts a state into pf, it knows it should just swallow the state silently without sending out another insert for it. ok sthen@ sashan@ |
date | 2023-07-31T12:00:07Z | |||
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author | tobhe | |||
files | src/sys/arch/macppc/dev/onyx.c | log | diff | annotate |
message |
Implement audio input source selection. from jon at elytron dot openbsd dot amsterdam feedback and ok miod@ |
date | 2023-07-31T12:23:35Z | |||
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author | kettenis | |||
files | src/sys/dev/fdt/axppmic.c | log | diff | annotate |
message |
Add AXP15060 support. ok uaa@ |
date | 2023-07-31T17:10:31Z | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
author | bluhm | |||
files | src/sys/arch/i386/i386/codepatch.c | log | diff | annotate |
src/sys/arch/i386/include/codepatch.h | log | diff | annotate | |
message |
Mark code parameter of codepatch_replace() constant also on i386. OK guenther@ |